Abstract. In this paper we develop a novel idea of multilinear cryptosystem using nilpotent group identities.
Introduction
In recent years multilinear maps have attracted attention in cryptography community. The idea has been first proposed by Boneh and Silverberg [1] . For n > 2 the existence of n-linear maps is still an open question. One of the main applications of multilinear maps is their use for indistinguishability obfuscation. For example in [5] Lin and Tessaro proved that trilinear maps are sufficient for the purpose of achieving indistinguishability obfuscation. Recently, Huang [3] constructed cryptographic trilinear maps that involve simple, non-ordinary abelian varieties over finite fields.
Group-based cryptography has some new direction to offer to answer this question. A bilinear cryptosystem using the discrete logarithm problem in matrices coming from a linear representation of a group of nilpotency class 2 has been proposed in [7] .
In this paper, we propose multilinear cryptosystems using identities in nilpotent groups, in which the security is based on the chosen discrete logarithm problem in finite p-groups.
Multilinear Maps in Cryptography
Let n be a positive integer. For cyclic groups G and G T of prime order p, a map e : G n → G T is said to be a (symmetric) n-linear map (or a multilinear map) if for any a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z and g 1 , . . . , g n ∈ G, we have
Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Graded Encoding Schemes
One of the interesting importance of multilinear maps arises in the notion of one of the revolution which swept the world of cryptography, namely fully homomophic encryption (FHE). The intuition is that FHE ciphertexts behave like the exponents of group elements in a multilinear map, the so called graded encoding scheme [2] . Such a scheme is a family of efficient cyclic groups G 1 , . . . , G n of the same prime order p together with efficient non-degenerate bilinear pairings e : G i × G j → G i+j whenever i + j ≤ n. In other words, if we fix a family of generators g i of the G i 's in such a way that g i+j = e(g i , g j ), we can add exponents within a given group G i g
and multiply exponents from two groups G i , G j as long as i + j ≤ n:
This makes g a i somewhat similar to an FHE encryption of a.
Generalization of Multilinear Maps to any Group
Here we generalize the definition of a multilinear map to arbitrary groups G and G T . We say that a map e : G n → G T is a (symmetric) n-linear map (or a multilinear map) if for any a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z and g 1 , . . . , g n ∈ G, we have
Notice that the map e is not necessarily linear in each component. In addition, we say that e is non-degenerate if there exists g ∈ G such that e(g, . . . , g) = 1.
Preliminaries

Semidirect Product
Let H and K be two groups. Denote by Aut(K) the group of automorphisms of K, and let α : H → Aut(K) be a homomorphism. Then the (external) semidirect product of K and H is the set
with the group operation given by
Here k
1 denotes the image of k 1 under the automorphism h α 2 . We observe that, for any integer a ≥ 1,
Nilpotent and Engel Groups
A group G is said to be nilpotent if it has a finite series
The length of a shortest central series is the (nilpotency) class of G. Of course, nilpotent groups of class at most 1 are abelian. A great source of nilpotent groups is the class of finite p-groups, i.e., finite groups whose orders are powers of a prime p. Close related to nilpotent groups is the calculus of commutators. Let g 1 , . . . , g n be elements of a group G. We will use the following commutator notation:
More generally, a simple commutator of weight n ≥ 2 is defined recursively by the rule
where by convention [
For the reader convenience, we recall the following property of commutators:
For further basic properties of commutators we refer to [9, 5.1] . It is useful to be able to form commutators of subsets as well as elements. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . be nonempty subsets of a group G. Define the commutator subgroup of X 1 and X 2 to be
More generally, let
where n ≥ 2. Then, there is a natural way of generating a descending sequence of commutator subgroups of a group, by repeatedly commuting with G. The result is a series
. This is called the lower central series of G and it does not in general reach 1. Notice that γ n (G)/γ n+1 (G) lies in the center of G/γ n+1 (G). A useful characterization of nilpotent groups, in terms of commutators, is the following. Lemma 1. A group G is nilpotent of class at most n ≥ 1 if and only if the identity [g 1 , . . . , g n+1 ] = 1 is satisfied in G, that is γ n+1 (G) = 1. In particular, in a nilpotent group of class n, the subgroup γ n (G) is central.
Among the
Conversely, any finite n-Engel group is nilpotent, by a well-known result of Zorn [9, 12.3.4 ].
Nilpotent Group Identities
The next result is a straightforward application of (2), together with Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1 and let a be a nonzero integer. Then, for all g 1 , . . . , g n ∈ G, we have
Then the following proposition holds: Proposition 1. Let G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1. Then
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a i ∈ Z\{0} and g i ∈ G.
Proof. We argue by induction on n. The case n = 2 is true by Lemma 2. Let n > 2. Then G/γ n (G) is nilpotent of class n − 1. Moreover, γ n (G) is central by Lemma 1. Hence the induction hypothesis gives
and so
by Lemma 2. ⊓ ⊔ Let G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1 and g 1 , . . . , g n ∈ G. According to Proposition 1 for any a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z\{0}, we have
Therefore we can construct the multilinear map e : G n → G given by
Similarly, given x ∈ G, we can consider the multilinear map e ′ :
Further, assuming that G is not (n − 1)−Engel, one can take x ∈ G in such a way that e ′ is non-degenerate. In fact there exists g ∈ G such that [x, n−1 g] = 1.
Multilinear Cryptography using Nilpotent Groups
Here we propose two multilinear cryptosystems based on the identity (3) in Proposition 1.
Protocol I
First we generalize the bilinear map which has been mentioned in [7] , to multilinear (n-linear) map for n + 1 users. Let A 1 , . . . , A n+1 be the users with private exponents a 1 , . . . , a n+1 respectively. Given an integer a = 0, the main formula on which our key-exchange protocol is based on, is an identity in a public nilpotent group G of class n > 1 (see Proposition 1):
The users A j 's transmit in public channel g i aj , for i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n + 1.
The key exchange works as follows:
The common key is [g 1 , . . . , g n ] n+1 j=1 aj .
Example: Trilinear Cryptography using Nilpotent Groups of class 3. Let A, B, C, D be the users with private exponents a, b, c, d respectively. The users A, B, C and D transmit in public channel
The common key is [x, y, z] abcd .
Protocol II
Let G be a public nilpotent group of class n + 1 which is not n-Engel (n ≥ 1). Then there exist x, g ∈ G such that [x, n g] = 1. Suppose that n + 1 users A 1 , . . . , A n+1 want to agree on a shared secret key. Each user A j selects a private nonzero integer a j , computes g aj and sends it to the other users. Then:
Hence, again by Proposition 1, each user obtains [x, n g] n+1 j=1 aj which is the shared key.
Security and Platform Group
The security of our protocols is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The ideal platform group for our protocols must be a nonabelian nilpotent group of large order such that the nilpotency class is not too large and the DLP in such a group is hard.
The Complexity of DLP in Finite p-Groups
In [10] , Sutherland has studied the DLP in finite abelian p-groups, and showed how to apply the algorithms for p-groups to find the structure of any finite abelian group.
In a series of papers by Mahalanobis, the DLP has been studied for finite p-groups but mostly for nilpotent groups of class 2 [6, 8] . In particular, in [7] , Mahalanobis and Shinde proposed p-groups of class 2 in which the platform is not practical as showed by the authors.
Solving the DLP in finite p-groups of larger class is an interesting question. We consider a semidirect product of cyclic p-groups of well-defined orders, to make a nilpotent group and then computing the DLP in each factor.
Suggested Platform
Take q = 2p
3 + 1 where p and q are large primes. Let H = h and K = k be the subgroups of Z * q of orders p 2 and p 3 , respectively. Selecting a nontrivial endomorphism h α of K amounts to selecting a positive integer m < p 3 such that
If m is relatively prime to p, then h α is actually an automorphism.
. Assuming x, y ∈ G such that x = (1, k), y = (h, 1), then we have for G the following presentation:
In particular G is a finite p-group of order p 5 and nilpotency class 3, which is not 2-Engel.
The group G could be considered as a platform for Protocols I and II for 4 and 3 users, respectively. The appropriate choice of p and q is important to provide security and efficiency.
DLP in Semidirect Product of Subgroups of Z * q
Let G = H ⋉ α K be as in 5.2, and assume a ≥ 1. By (1), for any g = (h, k) ∈ G, we have
The bottom line is that the DLP in G can be reduced to DLP on its factors. We focus on the second component of the element on the right; an easy computation shows that it is equal to
Thus, if the adversary chooses a "direct" attack, by trying to recover the private exponent a, he/she will have to solve the DLP twice: first to recover , and then to recover a from (p + 1)
a .
